Eyes on Russia

Report 6

22 April 2022

Eyes on Russia: Report 6

The Centre for Information Resilience's "Eyes on Russia" Project maps, documents and verifies significant incidents related to Russian aggression toward Ukraine. CIR investigators collate, geolocate, and verify information appearing on social media. Our latest findings can always be found on this [Twitter thread](#).

CIR contextualizes these details amid the discourse and developments every two weeks in these reports. Each day, the footage and imagery are added to the [Russia-Ukraine Monitor Map](#), which policymakers, journalists, and other OSINT researchers can use to track the conflict. As part of this effort, CIR publishes weekly written summaries of its research, detailing verified troop and equipment analysis, influence operation narratives, and broader updates. This is the sixth of such regular reports. The first report can be read [here](#).

The Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) is an independent, non-profit social enterprise dedicated to exposing human rights abuses, countering disinformation, and combating online behaviour harmful to women and minorities.

We believe, at a time of heightened tension, that journalists and policymakers should have easy access to verified information. The Eyes on Russia Project will aim to empower its audiences with analysis and facts on which they can rely.

If you require further information, please do get in touch at hello@info-res.org.

COLLECT	PRESERVE	ANALYSE	REVIEW	MAPPING	COMMUNITY
Social media research by the team and volunteers	5326 entries in database	3439 entries geolocated and analysed	3230 entries reviewed	3187 pins on the map	1178 geolocations on the map from the wider open-source community on twitter

1. Executive Summary

- Since the 6th of April, Russian forces have re-deployed across Ukraine in the lead up to the second phase of the Russian invasion to take Ukraine's Eastern Donbass region.[1] Multiple satellite imagery geolocated by CIR has confirmed Russian military build-up in Kherson airbase, close to Ukraine's border near Dubrovka and Biriuch in Russia, and moving south through Velykyi Burluk.

- As Russian forces are withdrawing from regions that were previously occupied, more evidence and testimonies are coming to light about Russian atrocities. CIR has published two separate investigations about Russian atrocities.

- The first is about mass graves in Yalivshchyna Forest near the city of Chernihiv. The mass graves evidenced wide scale civilian casualties in the wake of the Russian occupation of the city of Chernihiv and the broader region.

- The second focused on clear indications of Russian killings of Ukrainian civilians on highways across Ukraine. The investigation shows the wide scale and systematic targeting of Ukrainian civilians by Russian forces across the country.

- In the information sphere, CIR has observed systematic efforts to spread disinformation about Russian actions in Ukraine, particularly about the atrocities in Bucha and the missile attack in Kramatorsk on 8th April.

- On 13th April, CIR's Director of Investigations, Benjamin Strick, published a report about the online disinformation efforts surrounding the Russian massacres of civilians in Bucha titled "Disinformation & Denial: Russia's attempts to discredit open source evidence of Bucha." In the report, he details the efforts of a Russian endorsed site "War on Fakes" to discredit testimonies and footage coming to light from Bucha.

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[1] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/19/russia-has-begun-battle-for-donbas-in-ukraines-east-zelenskyy.

- On 8th April, a missile attack took place in Kramatorsk railway station as thousands of civilians were seeking to flee the city and nearby region from Russian attacks.[2] In the wake of the attack, CIR has observed the proliferation of a doctored BBC video that attempted to portray the missile attack as an operation carried out by the Ukrainian military.[3]

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[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61036740.
[3] https://twitter.com/BBCNewsPR/status/1514193082971037699.

2. Noted Narratives

Since 4th April CIR has continued to observe the promotion of Kremlin based conspiracy theories across social media platforms, with an attempt to continuously spread disinformation online about the legitimacy and rationale behind its ongoing invasion and occupation of Ukraine.

Developments in the disinformation sphere have included the following:

- **War on fakes and the denial of Russian atrocities in Bucha**

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24th February, continuous reports have confirmed that Russian forces have faced wide scale resistance which surpassed initial projections by the Kremlin.[4] Following a botched attempt by the Russian military to occupy the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, on 29th March Russian forces began withdrawing from Kyiv Oblast.

As Russian forces were re-deploying, images began emerging from Bucha, a small town near Kyiv, evidencing mass atrocities on the civilian populations. Corresponding with emerging footage, CIR was able to access to satellite imagery from 21st March that corroborated the presence of dead civilians on Bucha's road from 19th March while Russian forces were present.[5]

CIR's Director of Investigations, Benjamin Strick, published a report[6] showing how CIR used satellite imagery to corroborate the footage emerging from the ground.

The report focuses particular attention on the Kremlin's efforts to discredit evidence about atrocities in Bucha. Initial attempts were made by Putin's spokesperson, Dimitry Peskov to deny the evidence of war crimes[7]. Yet at the core of disinformation efforts around Bucha was a website, WaronFakes.[8]

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[4] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/23/russia-ukraine-war-one-month-in.
[5] https://www.info-res.org/post/disinformation-denial-russia-s-attempts-to-discredit-open-source-evidence-of-bucha.
[6] Ibid.
[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L0WScHPbaPA&t=446s.
[8] https://waronfakes.com/.

CIR analysis indicated that the site received significant amplification from the Russian government. The Kremlin's verified social media accounts are heavily contributing to the visibility of War on Fakes.[910] While the site claims to be independent, its content has been widely shared by Russian state media channels and staff, including [RIA Novosti](), RT editor-in-chief [Margarita Simonyan](), and TV presenter [Vladimir Soloviev]().

With footage from Bucha being verified by news outlets across the world,[1112] War on Fakes attempted to discredit witness reports and satellite imagery in an article titled "Sputnik and Fakodrom: What is known about the situation in Bucha on 6.04?"

The article alleged that no satellite imagery was available on 19th March and that shadows that were seen on the footage from Bucha did not match. This was incorrect. In fact, imagery from Maxar on 19th March confirmed the presence of civilian bodies on Yablunska Street in Bucha. The reason why they did not appear on the War on Fakes report was due to the angle of the satellite (nadir) being filtered out by the site.[13]

Regarding the shadows, War on Fakes references work undertaken by Telegram account Rybar,[14] which claimed that the shadows of dead civilian bodies do not match the timestamp of 09:08:31am, when satellite imagery was taken. The satellite imagery was taken at 09:00 am UTC, with Bucha, Ukraine being at UTC+2 on 19th March.

However, on 27th March Ukraine's timezone shifted to UTC+3, meaning that Rybar attempted to match the shadows with a 09:08:31 timestamp, not 11:08:31 which was Ukraine's timezone. These efforts by War on Fakes come in the midst of its ongoing efforts to circulate disinformation about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its targeting of civilian populations and infrastructure.

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[9] https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1500223302941487107?s=20&t=mvipBvY85vVFT3KiaMoFcQ.
[10] https://www.info-res.org/post/disinformation-denial-russia-s-attempts-to-discredit-open-source-evidence-of-bucha.
[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/04/world/europe/bucha-ukraine-bodies.html.
[12] https://www.bbc.com/news/60981238.
[13] https://www.info-res.org/post/disinformation-denial-russia-s-attempts-to-discredit-open-source-evidence-of-bucha.
[14] https://t.me/rybar/30591.

Figure 1: A screenshot taken on 15 April, showing the availability of satellite imagery on the 19th of March in Bucha.[15]

CIR analysed Telegram channels forwarding links to, or mentioning the main War On Fakes Telegram channel, and found that the Russian Ministry of Defence had forwarded posts from War On Fakes to its official Telegram channel 79 times between the 24th of February and 11th of March. Other official accounts forwarding or mentioning the War On Fakes channel include the Russian embassies in Ethiopia (37 times), Romania (11), Tajikistan (4) and Italy (1).

Interestingly, the channel was very frequently (225 times over the same period) promoted by several, similar "official channels" for various districts of Russia's Altai Republic. In addition, CIR found that Telegram channels run by the administrations of 11 district authorities in various regions of Russia had promoted the channel. This suggests that the Russian authorities are concerned about the impact of foreign reports of atrocities conducted during the invasion of Ukraine, and are using the War On Fakes channel to try and mitigate the effect of such reports at home.

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[15]https://www.info-res.org/post/disinformation-denial-russia-s-attempts-to-discredit-open-source-evidence-of-bucha.

- **Claims that Ukrainian residents would like to go to Russia**

Reports by Russian media have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian citizens would like to be a part of Russia and ultimately return, either physically or ideologically to Russia. These narratives were heavily amplified by the Kremlin in the months before the invasion of Ukraine, with Putin repeatedly claiming that Ukraine is a "province" of Russia and that Ukraine does not have a national identity.[16]

Following the Russian invasion these narratives were continuously propagated. Ukrainian civilians who were taken to Russia were forced to make public declarations of Russia's sanctity and protection of the civilian population during its invasion. CIR has noted these narratives in its previous report, accessible here.

With the redeployment of Russian forces across Ukraine, following the retreat from Kyiv Oblast, CIR has observed Russian media alleging that Ukrainian civilians are thankful for the Russian presence and would like to return to Russia.

In an article published on KP.RU, a Russian media outlet, by Alexander Kots, a known Russian propagandist, he interviews residents of Izyum, in Kharkiv Oblast attempting to portray the Russian occupiers as benevolent actors that are supporting the Ukrainian people. Kots interviews Ukrainian civilians claiming that they would only like to return to Russia.[17]

The attempts to whitewash the Russian occupation of Ukraine have been consistent since its onset on the 24th of February. These efforts come amidst the Russian military continuously

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[16]https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2022/2/23/22945781/russia-ukraine-putin-speech-transcript-february-22.
[17] https://www.kp.ru/daily/27376/4569036/.

targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, with CIR geolocating and verifying Ukrainian civilian casualties, mass graves, and infrastructure damage on our Russia-Ukraine monitor map.


Figure 2: A screenshot taken on 15 April, of an article by Alexander Kots about the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.[18]

- **Anti-Ukraine narratives on LinkedIn**

CIR has observed increased polarization of the debate around Ukraine on LinkedIn. This appeared to be fuelled by inauthentic accounts that publish and amplify content that discredits international assistance to Ukraine, both by posting on other users' profiles and sharing posts themselves.

These accounts are particularly active in disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives through comments on publications by influential LinkedIn figures, especially top EU politicians like Ursula von der Leyen or Christine Lagarde.

Accounts identified by CIR lack professional information on their profiles and display automated behaviour, some of them sharing between fifty and a hundred posts a day. Most of these accounts indicate they are located in Algiers or Indonesia (see screenshots, below), but their profiles use a mix of English (or, in some cases, another European language) and Russian.

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[18] https://www.kp.ru/daily/27376/4569036/

Two different groups of disinformation tactics have been identified as part of this inauthentic pro-Kremlin activity on LinkedIn, depending on whether the accounts are commenting on posts from other users supporting Ukraine or posting themselves:


Figure 3: Screenshots taken between 15th and 17th of April, showing some of the inauthentic LinkedIn profiles identified by CIR analysts.[19][20][21][22]

● **De-contextualization of information about Ukraine in LinkedIn comments**

Inauthentic accounts try to de-contextualize and diminish the importance of information shared by other LinkedIn users about the war in Ukraine by mentioning other past or ongoing international conflicts, especially those with US military involvement.

This tactic adopts the discursive line seen in different social media platforms that blames NATO and the US for the war in an attempt to convince LinkedIn audiences of the righteousness of Putin's cause to fight the US-backed Nazism of the "Ukrainian regime".

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[19] https://www.linkedin.com/in/alex-pavone-008073235/
[20] https://www.linkedin.com/in/jo-ni-11313012b/
[21] https://www.linkedin.com/in/pierre-roumani-474955234/
[22] https://www.linkedin.com/in/martinho-pereira-078892184/

Figure 4: Screenshot taken on 16th of April, showing an example of the activity of a pro-Kremlin LinkedIn account commenting on a post shared by Ursula von der Leyen on 12th April.[23]

[23]https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ursula-von-der-leyen_standupforukraine-activity-6919228612609011712-rH7T?utm_source=linkedin_share&utm_medium=member_desktop_web

● **Amplification of pro-Kremlin narratives on individual posts**

Through their profiles, these accounts amplify narratives from pro-Kremlin disinformation channels -e.g., reposting from RT or ZeroHedge -, boost the 'Nazi Ukraine' narrative, and publish false or unverified information about Russian gains in the war. Some of them also use the hashtag #IStandWithRussia, which so far has only five followers on LinkedIn.


Figure 5: Screenshots taken between 15th and 17th of April, showing an example of posts shared by pro-Kremlin LinkedIn accounts - in this case, amplifying the 'Nazi Ukraine' narrative.

- **Overlap between anti-Ukraine and alt-right narratives on fringe media**

Since the invasion started, there has been an overlap between alt-right and anti-Ukraine narratives[24], particularly significant on fringe web microblogging and social media platforms. In April, this trend continued.

CIR analysts have identified significant pro-Kremlin content on alternative social media platforms Gab[25] and Parler[26]. Users mix anti-vaxx and far-right disinformation with widespread narratives about the war in Ukraine. These include the "Nazi Ukraine" narrative, false accusations of war crimes allegedly committed by the Territorial Defense Forces, or claims about the Ukrainian armed forces using biological and chemical weapons.

Figure 6: Screenshot taken on 17th of April, showing an example where a Gab user accuses the Ukrainian Armed forces against civilians on a post shared on 16th of April.[27]

On these platforms, users disseminate niche alt-right disinformation[28], calling Ukraine a "Deep State Wonderland" and comparing the invasion to Covid in order to portray it as a distraction from the activities of the "global elites".

This rhetoric drives the in-platform conversation about Ukraine, generating a bandwagon effect that, reinforced by the conspiratorial nature of these sites, produces a single-sided view of the invasion: a fake war orchestrated by the US and NATO to support the interests of the Deep State.

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[24] https://www.politico.eu/article/antivax-conspiracy-lean-pro-kremlin-propaganda-ukraine/
[25] https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/17/tech/what-is-gab-explainer/index.html
[26]https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/10/tech/what-is-parler/index.html
[27] https://gab.com/silvermace2021.
[28] https://gab.com/NewsoftheNewWorld

Figure 7: Screenshot taken on 10th of April of a post shared by a Gab user on the 2nd of April, comparing the war in Ukraine to Covid-19 and implying that both are a distraction.[29]

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[29] https://gab.com/ESTEBOANDREU

- **'Needle Nazis' seeking World War III.**

A video published on the 2nd of March by Rick Wiles' American far-right conspiracy theory outfit TruNews has prompted alt-right accounts to utilise the term 'Needle Nazis' when referring to the activities of US, NATO, or EU decision-makers in Ukraine. The term 'Needle Nazis' was first used during COVID-19 to condemn mandatory vaccinations.[30]

TruNews' video proposes the conspiracy theory that there is an attempt to annihilate Russia by the same forces that imposed Covid lockdown, which have turned the channel from Covid propaganda to anti-Russia propaganda and are trying to start World War III. The video, reposted on alt-tech video hosting service Bichute, has been shared by Gab and Parler users. Currently, the conversation about 'Needle Nazis' is still ongoing on these platforms, fundamentally on Bichute.


Figure 8: Graphics showing the evolution of the 'Needle Nazi' conversation on Bichute, Parler, and Gab during the last month[31].

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[30] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/12/01/nazi-coronavirus-mandate-comparisons/
[31] https://www.smat-app.com/timeline?searchTerm=%22Needle%20Nazis%22&startDate=2022-03-20&endDate=2022-04-18&websites=gab,parler,telegram,bitchute_video,bitchute_comment&numberOf=10&interval=day&limit=1000&changepoint=false.

• **Faking BBC Videos**

On the 8th of April, a missile strike hit Kramatorsk train station. The station was widely known as a central location for civilians to seek safe passage and refuge away from the ongoing Russian shelling on the city and wider region. In the aftermath of the attack 50 people were killed and many more were injured.[32]

While Russia denies that it was behind the attack, the missiles used and recent targeting by Russian missile strikes in the vicinity of the train station in Kramatorsk heavily suggest that Russia was behind the attack.[33]

Since the attack took place, a fake video purporting to be published by the BBC has been amplified on Telegram and gained over 7,000 views on one channel.[34] This video comes as the Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to blame the attack on the Ukrainian military.

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[32] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61055105.
[33] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61036740.
[34] https://t.me/WiadomosciCzasowOstatecznych/5365.

Figure 9 (above: A screenshot taken on 18 April, of a doctored BBC video about the missile attack in Kramatorsk.[35]

Figure 10: A screenshot taken on 18 April, of a tweet by the BBC disputing the authenticity of the doctored video.[36]

- **False Claims that Lieutenant General Roger Cloutier has been captured in Mariupol**

Disinformation was spread on Twitter relating to the supposed capture of the Head of NATO forces, General Roger Cloutier. Since the 3rd of April 2022, there have been over 27,000 mentions of General Cloutier on twitter, with a range of allegations ranging from "General Cloutier being in the steel works"[37] to "Commander of NATO's Land army captured"[38].

The claim made its first appearance on Twitter on April 2nd, when Master•过客 (@lh9983[39]) tweeted:

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[35] https://t.me/WiadomosciCzasowOstatecznych/5365.

[36] https://twitter.com/BBCNewsPR/status/1514193082971037699.

[37] https://twitter.com/interocitor2/status/1511658114390663168?s=20&t=q3U4LyksYycgi4wp_33M4A

[38] https://twitter.com/WorldCNA/status/1513954236630937601?s=20&t=q3U4LyksYycgi4wp_33M4A

[39] https://twitter.com/lh9983

Figure 11: Screenshot taken on April 12 2022, the first tweet alleging the capture of General Cloutier, reading: "Rumor has it that the fellow is besieged in Mariupol. He is: Roger Cloutier, Commander of NATO Army Europe."[40]

Lt General Cloutier's name has appeared on Twitter over 25.6k times by 18.3k users since the 3rd of April 2022. In the proceeding three weeks, his name was mentioned 66 times by 63 users.

[40] https://twitter.com/lh9983/status/1510255546904952834.

Figure 12: A graph generated from Meltwater of mentions of Cloutiers name using the Latin, Cyrillic and Chinese alphabets.

The conspiracy began to spread on multiple platforms. Prominent China based English language YouTubers picked up the alleged capture and shared it on their platforms.

Figure 13 (above): A screenshot taken on April 12, showing Youtuber Jerry Goode talking about the alleged capture on his Daily Jerry channel.[41]

A video has also emerged on YouTube showing Cloutiers' arrest. The video is watermarked Ria Novosti, and shows a white man wearing a cap, with closely cropped hair being escorted by two people who have Russian flags on their shoulders.

Figure 14: Screenshot taken on 19 April of a video alleging capture of Lt Gen Cloutier on youtube. It has been viewed over 4500 times, and liked 33 times.[42]

This video was in fact published[43] on the 7th of April by the Russian state-owned RIA Novosti and was purportedly filmed in Crimea, showing the arrest of a man who was allegedly a member of a Ukrainian Crimean-Tatar battalion. RIA Novosti make no suggestion that the footage has anything to do with either Cloutier or Mariupol.

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[41] https://youtu.be/zR0-G-ge4b8
[42] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TJ4G2cBNC-U
[43] https://ria.ru/20220407/zaderzhanie-1782232107.html

10:39 07.04.2022 (обновлено: 13:20 07.04.2022)   ⊙ 77242

В Крыму задержали бойца крымско-татарского батальона

ФСБ задержала в Крыму бойца крымско-татарского батальона под видом беженца

Figure 15: A screenshot taken on 19 april titled: "FSB detain fighter from Crimean-Tatar battalion.""[44]

Cloutier's wikipedia page has also seen vibrant discussion alluding to his capture. His wiki page was created on 2nd May 2021 and received little in the way of expansions and edits. Between May 2021, and April 2022, his page received 11 edits.

Edits then ramped up beginning on 5th April. Between the 5th and the 19th there had been 154 edits. The first mention of Cloutier having died, or been captured, referenced on 5th April at 0030 GMT, where the claim that Cloutier had died in Mariupol.

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[44] https://ria.ru/20220407/zaderzhanie-1782232107.html.

Figure 16: A screenshot taken 19 Apr. Screenshot of the first mention of Cloutiers supposed death on Wikipedia.[45]

- **Use of Foreign POWs**

Several Russian propaganda channels on Telegram, Twitter and YouTube have been circulating footage of a British national in captivity. Aiden Aislin is an enlisted member of the Ukrainian 36th Naval Infantry Brigade, captured in Mariupol.

Russian channels are showing "interviews" with him that show clear signs of being recorded under duress.[46] During these videos, Aislin is presented as claiming to have observed Ukrainian atrocities against civilians, and states his support for the Russian invasion.

Aislin has clearly been beaten prior to these recordings, with some efforts made to disguise his injuries by sweeping his hair over a large mark on his forehead, likely caused by a rifle butt. CIR is currently investigating some of these videos and will publish a separate report related to them in the coming days.

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[45] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Cloutier.
[46] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNizGwjZbo0&ab_channel=GrahamPhillips.

3. Military Movements

Since the launch of the invasion, CIR has moved from tracking troop movements in Russia and Belarus to coverage of, *inter alia*, attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, weapons and equipment used by Russia, and Russian losses. Ukrainian troop movements are not reported as they are not the aggressor country and highlighting their positions may assist their adversary.

Russian Military Losses and Troop Movements

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February, repeated reports and intelligence briefings have confirmed that the Russian campaign has struggled with its initial plan of occupying Ukraine. Some reports have claimed that the Russian forces are experiencing significant logistical challenges with Russian forces.[47][48] Additionally satellite imagery has confirmed that Russian forces have withdrawn from Kyiv Oblast, with Russia preparing for an offensive on the Eastern part of Ukraine with a focus on Donbass.[49]

As Russian forces re-deploy to the Eastern parts of Ukraine, CIR has continued to geolocate and verify build-up of Russian forces in various parts of Ukraine. Camps and dug-in positions have been identified in Kherson airbase, Soloti, Russia 20km from the border with Ukraine, Dubrovka and Biriuch, Russia near the Ukrainian border, with a large Russian military convoy moving along the T-1313 highway near Bilokurakyne in Ukraine.

CIR has also been tracking the numerous positions where Russian forces have been firing from, to link firing positions to footage that indicates attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. These firing positions are updated in the map, and through an independent Twitter thread on the CIR Twitter account.

CIR continues to map Russian losses, military movements, and firing positions. Notable examples over the past week include the following:

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[47] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/8/russia-facing-setbacks-in-ukraine-us-intelligence-officials-say.
[48] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-europe-nato-49abe49e9b35833a385fe10db802dc5a.
[49] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60945068.

- On the 13th of April, satellite imagery showed significant build-up and dug-in positions in the Kherson airbase.
- On the 11th of April, satellite imagery showed significant build-up in Soloti, Russia, just over 20km from Ukraine's border.
- On the 11th of April, satellite imagery showed a Russian military convoy along T-1313 highway near Bilokurakyne in Ukraine.
- On the 9th of April, satellite imagery showed a large Russian build up close to Ukraine's border near Dubrovka and Biriuch in Russia.
- On the 8th of April, satellite imagery showed a Russian convoy moving south through Velykyi Burluk.

Civilian Casualties and Infrastructure

Attacks on civilians, civilian buildings and other infrastructure have sharply increased in the previous days and are too numerous to list (please see CIR map).

With Russian forces re-deploying across Ukraine, increased footage has been shared of Russian atrocities over the past two weeks, particularly in Kyiv Oblast and Chernihiv Oblast. CIR analysts have conducted in-depth investigations about the atrocities, geolocating and verifying mass graves of massacred Ukrainian civilians with additional civilian casualties geolocated across both Bucha and Irpin in Kyiv Oblast and Chernihiv. More information about CIR's in-depth investigation about Russian atrocities and mass graves in Chernihiv can be found here, with an accompanying Twitter thread found here.

Additional notable examples geolocated by CIR include:
- On the 15th of April, satellite imagery showed numerous grave lines in the Russian occupied city of Kherson.
- On the 15th of April, satellite imagery showed mass graves in Chernihiv's Yalivshchyna forest still growing.
- On the 9th of April, satellite imagery showed large amounts of destruction and numerous fires burning in Ukraine's Mariupol.
- On the 8th of April, the Kramatorsk train station was struck by Russian forces with satellite imagery showing the aftermath of the attacks.

Russian Military Losses and Movements

Figure 17: A screenshot taken on 18 April, 2022 of aerial footage showing Russian positions being shelled inside a forest near Motyzhyn, Kyiv Oblast; geolocated to 50.394452, 29.966034.[50]

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[50] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514573730953023489.

Figure 18: Satellite imagery taken on 13 April, 2022 showing build-up of Russian forces in Kherson Airbase; geolocated to 46.676, 32.508.[51]

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[51] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514141647067652100/photo/1.

Figure 19 (above): Satellite imagery taken on 13 April, 2022 showing build-up of Russian forces in Kherson Airbase and dug-in positions; geolocated to 46.676, 32.508.[52]

Figure 20 (above): Satellite imagery taken on 11 April, 2022 of a Russian military convoy along T-1313 highway near Bilokurakyne in Ukraine.[53]

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[52] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514141647067652100/photo/2.
[53] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514145333957255169/photo/1.

Figure 21 (above): Satellite imagery taken on 11 April, 2022 of a Russian military convoy along T-1313 highway near Bilokurakyne in Ukraine.[54]

Figure 22: Satellite imagery taken on 11 April, 2022 showing Russian military build-up in Soloti Russia; geolocated to 50.241, 37.972.[55]

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[54] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514145333957255169/photo/2.
[55] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514142735137185792.

Figure 23: Satellite imagery taken on 9 April, 2022 of Russian military forces build-up close to Ukraine's border near Dubrovka and Biriuch in Russia; geolocated to 50.240322, 37.730044.[56]

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[56] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514144251680116740/photo/1.

Figure 24: Satellite imagery taken on 9 April, 2022 of Russian military forces build-up close to Ukraine's border near Dubrovka and Biriuch in Russia; geolocated to 50.251931, 37.719065.[57]

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[57] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514144251680116740/photo/2.

Figure 25: Satellite imagery taken on 9 April, 2022 showing a Russian convoy moving south through Velykyi Burluk; geolocated 50.078247, 37.386107.[58]

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[58] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1513066078179635203/photo/1.

Figure 26 (above): Satellite imagery taken on 9 April, 2022 showing a Russian convoy moving south through Velykyi Burluk; geolocated 50.078247, 37.386107.[59]

Civilian Casualties and Infrastructure Damage

Figure 27: Satellite imagery taken on 15 April, 2022 showing grave lines in the Russian occupied city of Kherson; geolocated to 46.669554, 32.530406.[60]

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[59] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1513066078179635203/photo/2.
[60] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1515002639745961989.

Figure 28: Satellite imagery taken on 28 February, 2022 showing grave lines in the Russian occupied city of Kherson; geolocated to 46.669554, 32.530406.[61]

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[61] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1515002639745961989.

Figure 29: Satellite imagery taken on 15 April, 2022 showing mass graves in Chernihiv's Yalivshchyna; geolocated to 51.527611, 31.302965.[62]

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[62] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514984494608138240.

Figure 30: Satellite imagery taken on 26 February, 2022 showing mass graves in Chernihiv's Yalivshchyna; geolocated to 51.527611, 31.302965.[63]

Figure 31: Satellite imagery taken 9 April, 2022 showing wide scale destruction and numerous fires burning in Mariupol; geolocated to 47.079, 37.508.[64]

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[63] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514984494608138240.
[64] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514138732500291586/photo/1.

Figure 32: Satellite imagery taken 9 April, 2022 showing wide scale destruction and numerous fires burning in Mariupol; geolocated to 47.109, 37.611.[65]

Figure 33: Satellite imagery taken 9 April, 2022 showing wide scale destruction and numerous fires burning in Mariupol; geolocated to 47.108, 37.635.[66]

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[65] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514138732500291586/photo/2.
[66] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1514138732500291586/photo/3.

Figure 34: Aerial footage taken on 8 April, 2022 showing the site of the missile attack on Kramatorsk train station.[67]

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[67] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1512357522077802496.

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